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NOTE
Disentangling Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G)(2):  The
“New Evidence” Exception to the Ban on Successive
Motions for Relief from Judgment Does Not
Contain a Discoverability Requirement
Claire V. Madill*
Michigan courts are engaging in a costly interpretative mistake. Confused by
the relationship between two distinct legal doctrines, Michigan courts are con-
flating laws in a manner that precludes convicted defendants from raising
their constitutional claims in postconviction proceedings. In Michigan, a con-
victed defendant who wishes to collaterally attack her conviction must file a
6.500 motion. The Michigan Court Rules generally prohibit “second or subse-
quent” motions. Nonetheless, section 6.502(G)(2) permits a petitioner to
avoid this successive motion ban if her claim relies on “new evidence that was
not discovered” before her original postconviction motion. Misguided by the
similarity between the language of section 6.502(G)(2) and the Michigan Su-
preme Court’s opinion in People v. Cress, Michigan courts have started con-
flating the four-prong Cress legal standard with section 6.502(G)(2)’s “new
evidence” exception to the ban on successive motions. This conflation imposes
an additional discoverability element on the “new evidence” exception: a court
will dismiss a petitioner’s motion as successive if the petitioner could have
discovered the evidence underlying the motion through the exercise of reason-
able diligence. This Note demonstrates that the conflation of section
6.502(G)(2) and the Cress standard, and the resulting imposition of an addi-
tional discoverability requirement on the “new evidence” exception, is plainly
wrong. It contradicts the text and structure of the Michigan Court Rules and
imposes unintended adverse consequences on criminal defendants seeking to
vindicate their constitutional rights.
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Introduction
An alarming trend has emerged in postconviction litigation in the state
of Michigan. Michigan courts have become confused by the relationship be-
tween two distinct legal doctrines that happen to share similar language.
This confusion has led Michigan courts to conflate two separate legal tests.
In doing so, courts have imposed significant unintended and adverse conse-
quences on criminal defendants.
The first of the two legal doctrines that courts conflate involves the pro-
cedures governing postconviction litigation. Like all states, Michigan recog-
nizes that a criminal conviction has serious ramifications for a person’s
liberty and other interests.1 Consequently, Michigan created a set of court
rules, known collectively as subchapter 6.500, which outlines the procedures
a prisoner may use to challenge her conviction, even after her trial and direct
appeal have ended.2 Legislators drafted these rules to accommodate compet-
ing interests. On one hand, Michigan recognizes that litigation must end at
some point and consequently imposes a number of procedural barriers that
may prevent review of a petitioner’s claim.3 At the same time, Michigan
1. See Mary C. Hutton, Retroactivity in the States: The Impact of Teague v. Lane on State
Postconviction Remedies, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 421, 441 (1993). See generally Inst. of Continuing
Legal Educ., Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, January 2015 Up-
date (Tracey W. Brame ed., 2015); Miriam Aukerman, Legal Aid of W. Mich., Collat-
eral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: A Legal Outline for Michigan (2008),
http://reentry.mplp.org/reentry/images/3/39/SADO_Legal_Outline_Kalamazoo.doc (discuss-
ing the consequences of convictions in Michigan for employment, housing, and public
benefits).
2. Mich. Ct. R. 6.501–.509; see Stuart G. Friedman, Hurdling the 6.500 Barrier: A Guide
to Michigan Post-Conviction Remedies, 14 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 65, 65 (1997).
3. See People v. Reed, 535 N.W.2d 496, 503 (Mich. 1995) (“Before [the adoption of
Subchapter 6.500], the procedure for collateral review of criminal convictions in Michigan did
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recognizes that the costs of postconviction litigation and finality are out-
weighed by the needs to protect individual rights and ensure the litigation of
colorable constitutional claims.4 Subchapter 6.500’s rules governing when a
convicted defendant can file a successive postconviction motion exemplify
this balance. The rules provide that under most circumstances, a defendant
can file only one postconviction 6.500 motion.5 This rule aims to reduce the
amount of postconviction litigation.6 At the same time, the rules permit a
defendant to bring a “second or subsequent” 6.500 motion if she has “new
evidence” that was not previously discovered. Michigan adopted this new
evidence exception to ensure that at least some successive motions raising
colorable claims prevail. This new evidence exception to the ban on succes-
sive motions, codified in section 6.502(G)(2), is the first of the two legal
doctrines that Michigan courts are confusing.
The second of the two legal doctrines is called a Cress “newly discovered
evidence” claim.7 The Michigan Supreme Court acknowledged that some-
times new evidence emerges after trial that undermines a defendant’s con-
viction.8 For example, a victim may recant,9 DNA tests may be conducted,10
or a new scientific breakthrough might occur.11 To provide redress for a
defendant with newly discovered evidence that casts doubt on her convic-
tion, the court outlined a legal claim for relief in People v. Cress.12 Cress
established that if a defendant’s evidence satisfies four elements, then she is
entitled to a new trial “on the basis of newly discovered evidence.”13
not make any provision for finality of judgments. As a consequence, defendants could, and
did, repeatedly seek relief without limitation.”); Friedman, supra note 2, at 65 (“[6.500 proce-
dures] replaced an equitable system of post-conviction relief with a more rigid approach that
places many hurdles in a criminal defendant’s path.”).
4. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 85–86 (“[Section 6.508(D)(3)’s ‘actual innocence’ ex-
ception] recognize[s] that the societal interest of insuring compliance with state procedural
rules cannot outweigh the societal interest in preventing the conviction of the innocent.”); see
also Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (noting that courts have interests in
conserving judicial resources and in the finality of judgments); Hutton, supra note 1, at 426
(noting the tension between vindication of individual rights and concerns of comity and
finality).
5. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(1).
6. Cf. Nicholas Matteson, Note, Feeling Inadequate?: The Struggle to Define the Savings
Clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 353, 386 (2013) (“[T]he successive motion bar [of
28 U.S.C. § 2255] sought to eliminate[ ] prisoners filing repeated motions arguing the same
claim or withholding claims in order to receive multiple rounds of judicial review.”).
7. People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. 2003).
8. See id. at 182.
9. See, e.g., People v. Canter, 496 N.W.2d 336, 340–42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (noting
that a victim’s recantation testimony served as the basis of a petitioner’s newly discovered
evidence claim).
10. Caitlin Plummer & Imran Syed, “Shifted Science” and Post-Conviction Relief, 8 Stan.
J. C.R. & C.L. 259, 288 n.136 (2012).
11. See id. at 287–89.
12. 664 N.W.2d 174 (Mich. 2003).
13. Cress, 664 N.W.2d at 182.
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Although the term “newly discovered evidence” uses similar language to
the section 6.502(G)(2) “new evidence” exception to the ban on successive
motions, the two doctrines are quite distinct. Subchapter 6.500, including
section 6.502(G)(2), operates as a set of procedural rules and applies every
time a convicted defendant challenges her conviction in postconviction pro-
ceedings.14 In contrast, Cress establishes a substantive claim for relief.15 If a
convicted defendant has newly discovered evidence, she is entitled to a new
trial as long as she meets the four elements of Cress.16 As a substantive doc-
trine, a Cress “newly discovered evidence” claim can be raised at any time
after conviction. A defendant does not necessarily have to raise her Cress
claim through a 6.500 motion; she can also raise it on direct appeal or in a
motion for a new trial immediately after her conviction.17
Although these two legal standards are distinct, Michigan courts fre-
quently apply the Cress four-prong test to successive 6.500 motions. Judges
apply this test even if a petitioner does not raise a Cress newly discovered
evidence claim but rather asserts a constitutional claim, such as an allegation
that her counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective or that the state sup-
pressed favorable evidence in violation of due process.18 Because one of the
elements of Cress is that “the party could not, using reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced the evidence at trial,”19 this conflation
imposes an additional discoverability element on section 6.502(G)(2)’s new
14. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 65 (describing subchapter 6.500 as “formal procedures
for post-conviction relief”).
15. See Plummer & Syed, supra note 10, at 287 (describing Cress as a “common appellate
claim[ ]” that may warrant relief).
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., People v. Bryant, Nos. 306602, 318765, 2014 WL 4214849 (Mich. Ct. App.
Aug. 26, 2014) (dealing with a Cress newly discovered evidence claim during a petitioner’s
appeal as of right).
18. See, e.g., People v. Swain (Swain II), No. 314564, 2015 WL 521623, at *1–4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Feb. 5, 2015) (citing Cress and denying a new trial because defendant failed to exercise
due diligence in investigating a potential witness before trial); People v. Vinson, No. 303593,
2012 WL 3046236, at *6–7 (Mich. Ct. App. July 26, 2012) (citing Cress and denying a new trial
because defendant should have sought independent testing at trial); People v. Swain, 794
N.W.2d 92, 102 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (noting, without addressing whether the trial court
acted properly, that the court imposed a discoverability requirement on the section
6.502(G)(2) new evidence exception); People v. Freeman, No. W-86-128340-FC, slip op. at
4–5, 9–14 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 2014) (“[T]he generally applied newly discovered evidence
standard set forth in People v Cress has been regularly applied to motions brought under MCR
6.502(G)(2).” (citation omitted)); People v. Johnson, No. 99-005393-01, slip op. at 2 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (applying Cress where defendant claimed prosecutors suppressed evi-
dence), appeal denied, No. 99-005393-FC (Mich. Ct. App. May 30, 2013), remanded, 855
N.W.2d 750 (Mich. 2014); People v. Woods, No. 03-11636, slip op. at 6–10 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
June 17, 2011) (repeatedly conflating Brady with the “newly discovered evidence” test and
denying petitioner’s Brady claims on the ground that the proffered evidence was not “newly
discovered evidence” within the meaning of Cress), appeal denied, 858 N.W.2d 423 (Mich.
2015).
19. People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Mich. 2003) (quoting People v. Johnson, 545
N.W.2d 637, 638 n.6 (Mich. 1996)).
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evidence exception.20 This engrafting of Cress into the Michigan Court Rules
governing postconviction proceedings has enormous consequences for a
convicted defendant seeking to overturn her unconstitutional conviction on
the basis of a non-Cress claim.21
This Note dispels the erroneous notion that a petitioner’s diligence is
relevant to determining whether the motion raises new evidence, permitting
the petitioner to avoid the general ban on successive motions. Part I details
the law relevant to this particular statutory problem: subchapter 6.500 of the
Michigan Court Rules and the Cress newly discovered evidence standard.
Part II outlines the problem and explains the appropriate definition of sec-
tion 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception. A court should permit a peti-
tioner to avoid the ban on successive motions as long as she alleges “a claim
of new evidence that was not [previously] discovered,”22 regardless of
whether the evidence was discoverable at an earlier time. Part II explains why
the imposition of Cress—that is, a diligence requirement—is improper
when analyzing whether a 6.500 motion should be denied as successive, not-
withstanding unpublished Michigan court opinions to the contrary. Courts
that apply the Cress test when deciding whether a 6.500 motion falls within
section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception perpetuate a misunderstand-
ing that prevents criminal defendants from vindicating their constitutional
rights.
I. Relevant Law
The statutory interpretation mistake outlined in this Note stems from
confusion over the complicated interaction between two separate provisions
of Michigan law: subchapter 6.500 of the Michigan Court Rules (specifically,
section 6.502(G)(2)) and the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling in Cress.
This Part gives a brief overview of these two provisions of Michigan law. It
concludes by explaining the differences and interaction between section
6.502(G)(2) and Cress.
A. General Overview of Michigan’s Procedures for Postconviction Relief
Subchapter 6.500 is a set of Michigan Court Rules outlining the pro-
cedures a petitioner must follow if she wishes to collaterally attack her
conviction.23 Under these rules, a petitioner with a claim of legal error may
file a postconviction motion for relief from judgment after the conclusion of
20. See, e.g., Swain II, 2015 WL 521623, at *2 (improperly conflating Cress and section
6.502(G)(2) and denying a 6.500 motion as successive for failing “to exercise the required
reasonable diligence”).
21. See infra Section II.E.1.
22. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(2).
23. Mich. Ct. R. 6.501–.509; see also Friedman, supra note 2, at 67–70 (describing the
exclusivity of the 6.500 procedure). A 6.500 motion is the only way for a convicted defendant
to collaterally attack her conviction in a Michigan state court. Mich. Ct. R. 6.501 cmt. (1989)
(“Subchapter 6.500 . . . provides the exclusive means to challenge convictions in Michigan
courts for a defendant who has had an appeal by right or by leave, who has unsuccessfully
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the direct appeal process.24 The most commonly alleged substantive claims
in 6.500 motions are ineffective assistance of counsel,25 the state’s failure to
disclose exculpatory and material evidence to the defense (Brady viola-
tions),26 and newly discovered evidence under Cress.27 The text of subchapter
6.500 does not limit a petitioner to these specific claims, however; she is free
to raise other claims such as sentencing issues.28
Subchapter 6.500 specifies in detail the various procedures governing
the postconviction challenge process. For example, various subsections lay
out the requirements for the content of a 6.500 motion, describe how to
properly file and serve a 6.500 motion, explain the trial court’s duties upon
receiving a 6.500 motion, and grant the judge authority to order an expan-
sion of the record,29 an evidentiary hearing,30 or an oral argument.31
Two sections of subchapter 6.500 are especially important for the pur-
poses of this Note. First, section 6.508(D) restricts when a 6.500 motion may
be granted, regardless of the underlying substantive claim or the number of
6.500 motions previously filed. Under section 6.508(D)(3), a court may not
grant relief if the motion alleges grounds for relief that could have been
raised on appeal or in a prior 6.500 motion, unless the petitioner demon-
strates good cause and actual prejudice. The good cause requirement may be
waived if the court concludes there is a significant possibility that the peti-
tioner is innocent of the crime.32
Second, section 6.502(G) deals with the possibility of the same peti-
tioner filing multiple 6.500 motions. Like many postconviction regimes, sec-
tion 6.502(G)(1) establishes the general rule that only one postconviction
motion for relief from judgment is permitted.33 But subchapter 6.500 does
sought leave to appeal, or who is unable to file an application for leave to appeal to the Court
of Appeals because 18 months have elapsed since the judgment.”).
24. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(A).
25. See, e.g., People v. Reed, 535 N.W.2d 496 (Mich. 1995); People v. Vinson, No.
303593, 2012 WL 3046236, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 26, 2012); People v. Love, No. 202344,
1998 WL 1990445, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 31, 1998).
26. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see, e.g., People v. Freeman, 839 N.W.2d 492
(Mich. 2013); People v. Jahner, No. 255405, 2005 WL 119818, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 20,
2005); Love, 1998 WL 1990445, at *1.
27. See, e.g., Vinson, 2012 WL 3046236, at *1; People v. Swain, 794 N.W.2d 92 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2010); People v. Taylor, No. 284331, 2008 WL 5197084, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 11,
2008); People v. McSwain, 676 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); Love, 1998 WL 1990445, at
*1.
28. See e.g., People v. Kimble, 684 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 2004) (sentencing scoring error);
People v. Carpentier, 521 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. 1994) (Gideon violation); People v. Watroba, 483
N.W.2d 441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (illusory plea agreement).
29. Mich. Ct. R. 6.507.
30. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(C).
31. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(B).
32. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3).
33. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(1) (“[O]ne and only one motion for relief from judgment
may be filed with regard to a conviction.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) (2012) (“A claim
presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . . that was presented in a prior
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not categorically ban all “second or subsequent” motions.34 Instead, the
rules permit a successive 6.500 motion if the motion is “based on . . . a claim
of new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion.”35 For
example, if a petitioner discovers after her first 6.500 motion that her coun-
sel failed to properly investigate the victim’s time of death,36 the petitioner
could file a successive 6.500 motion claiming new evidence of ineffective
assistance of counsel without violating section 6.502(G)(1). Overall, section
6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception allows a petitioner to bypass the suc-
cessive motion ban.
B. Cress: Michigan’s Legal Standard for “Newly Discovered Evidence”
In 2003, the Michigan Supreme Court decided Cress, the decision that
laid out the standard governing when “a new trial [is] to be granted on the
basis of newly discovered evidence.”37 Petitioner Cress was convicted of
application shall be dismissed.”); People v. Morgan, 817 N.E.2d 524, 527 (Ill. 2004) (“[The
Illinois] Post-Conviction Hearing Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction peti-
tion.”). Prior to the adoption of subchapter 6.500, no such prohibition existed. Friedman,
supra note 2, at 94–95. Because this restriction did not exist prior to August 1, 1995, a peti-
tioner who filed one or more motions before that date is permitted to file one more motion
without it being considered successive. Id. at 95. So, if a petitioner filed a motion for postcon-
viction relief before August 1, 1995, and then files another motion after that date, the review-
ing judge should skip the restrictions of section 6.502(G)(1) and move on to reviewing the
merits of the motion under section 6.508(D). Id.; cf. People v. Swain, 794 N.W.2d 92, 107
(Mich. Ct. App. 2010) (“[A]fter the trial court has determined that the successive motion falls
within one of the two exceptions [in Section 6.502(G)(2),] . . . [then] MCR 6.508 and the
‘good cause’ and ‘actual prejudice’ requirements of MCR 6.508(D)(3) become relevant.”).
34. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(2).
35. Id. A petitioner can also avoid the general bar on successive 6.500 motions by dem-
onstrating a retroactive change in law that occurred after the first motion for relief from judg-
ment. Id. While no published appellate authority in Michigan has permitted a petitioner’s
successive motion to proceed under this retroactive change in law exception, a few cases hint at
circumstances that would allow it. See People v. Jones, No. 1979-1104-FC, 2011 WL
7404445 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 21, 2011) (applying the retroactivity exception to the ban on
successive motions to permit a petitioner to raise a claim in a 6.500 motion that his life with-
out parole sentence violated the Eighth Amendment); see also People v. Stovall, 764 N.W.2d
786, 786–87 (Mich. 2009) (Kelly, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the petitioner’s 6.500 motion
was improperly denied as successive under section 6.502(G)(1) when the petitioner relied on a
federal district court case holding that a parole board policy change violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause when retroactively applied to prisoners); In re Kadzban, 746 N.W.2d 304, 304–05
(Mich. 2008) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that because the Michigan Supreme
Court’s decision in People v. Cornell, 646 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 2002), was partially retroactive,
some petitioners could take advantage of the retroactive change in law exception, but conclud-
ing that this exception did not apply to the petitioner because Cornell was decided before the
petitioner’s first 6.500 motion). The retroactive change in law and new evidence exceptions are
thus the only exceptions to Michigan’s ban on successive 6.500 motions. See, e.g., Swain, 794
N.W.2d at 107.
36. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, No. 298929, 2013 WL 5762991, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App.
Oct. 24, 2013).
37. People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Mich. 2003).
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murder, but an imprisoned serial killer later confessed to the same murder.38
Because his conviction had already been affirmed on appeal, Cress filed a
6.500 motion, arguing that the serial killer’s confession constituted newly
discovered evidence that undermined his original conviction.39 A newly dis-
covered evidence claim was the only substantive argument before the Michi-
gan Supreme Court; Cress did not raise any constitutional claims, such as a
Brady or ineffective assistance of counsel claim.40
Cress lost, with the Michigan Supreme Court holding “that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a new
trial on the asserted ground of newly discovered evidence.”41 In doing so, the
Michigan Supreme Court laid out the four-prong test:
For a new trial to be granted on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a
defendant must show: (1) “the evidence itself, not merely its materiality,
was newly discovered;” (2) “the newly discovered evidence was not cumu-
lative;” (3) “the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have discov-
ered and produced the evidence at trial;” and (4) the new evidence makes a
different result probable on retrial.42
Because the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that
the confession “would not make a different result probable on retrial,” the
court denied Cress relief.43
C. Comparing Cress with Section 6.502(G)(2)
The purpose of this Note is to explain that Cress’s newly discovered evi-
dence standard and section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception to the ban
on successive 6.500 motions are not the same. Newly discovered evidence
from Cress is a substantive legal doctrine that permits a defendant to attack
her conviction.44 In this respect, newly discovered evidence is analogous to a
Brady or ineffective assistance of counsel claim. All three represent legal
claims that a defendant can employ to challenge her conviction.45 Case law
has established the elements a defendant must meet before she is entitled to
relief for each type of claim. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court
38. Id. at 176–77.
39. Id. at 177.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 182.
42. Id. (quoting People v. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d 637, 638 n.6 (Mich. 1996)).
43. Id. at 183.
44. See People v. Grissom, 821 N.W.2d 50, 59 (Mich. 2012) (noting that a petitioner is
entitled to a new trial if she meets the four elements of a newly discovered evidence claim).
45. See People v. Love, No. 202344, 1998 WL 1990445 (Mich. Ct. App. July 31, 1998)
(granting relief on newly discovered evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and Brady
claims); Plummer & Syed, supra note 10, at 280–89 (acknowledging these three claims as
viable avenues to attack a conviction); cf. Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate
Process, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 591, 611 (2009) (noting that in Wisconsin, an appellate attorney can
protect an innocent petitioner during the appellate process by seeking a new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, or a Brady claim).
June 2015] Disentangling Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G)(2) 1435
provided that a defendant may prevail on a Brady claim if “(1) the prosecu-
tion has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3)
that is material.”46 Similarly, Strickland v. Washington established that a de-
fendant is entitled to a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel if she
demonstrates the “two components” of deficient performance and
prejudice.47 Cress identifies the four elements a defendant must satisfy before
she is entitled to relief on the basis of newly discovered evidence in Michi-
gan.48 The substantive doctrine of newly discovered evidence serves as a
catchall claim to cover situations in which new evidence undermines confi-
dence in an original conviction, but no constitutional violation occurred.49
In contrast, subchapter 6.500 is merely one procedural vehicle through
which a defendant can raise one of these substantive legal claims.50 There is
no such thing as a 6.500 claim in and of itself; a petitioner must allege some
underlying substantive claim before filing her motion.51 While this underly-
ing claim can be a newly discovered evidence claim (to which Cress would
apply),52 it could also be a Brady claim, an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, or some other claim.53 As part of
subchapter 6.500, section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception is not a sub-
stantive legal claim, but rather an exception to a procedural requirement
that would otherwise bar relief.54
An outline of the analysis a trial judge should follow when addressing a
successive 6.500 motion further helps elucidate this distinction between a
Cress newly discovered evidence claim and the section 6.502(G)(2) new evi-
dence exception to the ban on successive motions. When analyzing the mer-
its of a successive 6.500 motion, a judge engages in a three-step inquiry.55
First, she determines whether the motion falls within an exception to the
general prohibition on successive motions.56 If not, the judge must dismiss
46. 845 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Mich. 2014); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87
(1963).
47. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
48. Cress, 664 N.W.2d at 182.
49. Cf. Plummer & Syed, supra note 10, at 280–81, 283–84, 287–89 (arguing that consti-
tutional claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, Brady, and prosecutorial misconduct
are ill-suited for an actually innocent petitioner convicted on the basis of junk science, but that
a newly discovered evidence claim “possibly works”).
50. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
51. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(C)(12) (noting that a 6.500 motion must include “[t]he
grounds for the relief requested”).
52. See, e.g., People v. Swain, 794 N.W.2d 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
53. See, e.g., People v. Love, No. 202344, 1998 WL 1990445 (Mich. Ct. App. July 31,
1998) (granting relief on newly discovered evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and
Brady claims).
54. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(1) (banning successive motions).
55. If a judge is analyzing an initial 6.500 motion, rather than a subsequent one, she
would skip this first step.
56. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(1).
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the motion as successive.57 The judge should not even reach the merits of the
substantive claim or the issue of whether the issue could have been raised on
appeal.58 In contrast, if the petitioner alleges an exception, the judge contin-
ues on to the second step.59
At this juncture, the judge examines the procedural merits of the mo-
tion under 6.508(D).60 If the petitioner alleges grounds for relief that could
have been raised earlier, then the judge must deny the motion.61 However, if
the petitioner alleges grounds that could not have been raised earlier or,
alternatively, meets the cause/innocence and prejudice standard, then the
trial court moves on to the third and final inquiry: examination of the sub-
stantive claim underlying the motion.62 For example, if the petitioner alleges
that her Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel was denied, the court
then analyzes whether the petitioner has satisfied Strickland’s performance
and prejudice prongs.63 Similarly, if the petitioner raises a newly discovered
evidence claim,64 the court determines if the petitioner has met the four
Cress elements.65
If the petitioner falls within a section 6.502(G)(2) exception and satisfies
her burden with regard to both the procedural requirements of section 6.508
and the underlying substantive claim, the trial court should grant relief.66
Overall, section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception is part of a larger pro-
cedural scheme and only applies during the first step of analyzing a 6.500
motion, while the Cress newly discovered evidence doctrine constitutes the
substantive legal claim underlying the motion and is only relevant during
the third step of inquiry.
57. Id.; see also Swain, 794 N.W.2d at 106 (dismissing petitioner’s 6.500 motion as
successive).
58. Swain, 794 N.W.2d at 104, 107 (“Any successive motion that does not assert one of
these two exceptions is to be returned to the defendant without filing by the court. . . . Only
after the trial court has determined that the successive motion falls within one of the two
exceptions do MCR 6.508 and the ‘good cause’ and ‘actual prejudice’ requirements of MCR
6.508(D)(3) become relevant.”).
59. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(2).
60. See Swain, 794 N.W.2d at 107.
61. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3).
62. See People v. Love, No. 202344, 1998 WL 1990445, at *8–12 (Mich. Ct. App. July 31,
1998) (waiving the good cause requirement and analyzing the petitioner’s Brady claim on the
merits, finding “a significant possibility that [petitioner] was innocent of the crime”).
63. See, e.g., id. at *8.
64. E.g., People v. Canter, 496 N.W.2d 336, 340 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that a
victim’s recantation testimony served as the basis of a petitioner’s newly discovered evidence
claim).
65. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Love, 1998 WL 1990445.
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II. Imposing Cress or a Discoverability Requirement on Section
6.502(G)(2)’s “New Evidence” Exception is Wrong
Michigan courts have started engrafting the Cress standard for newly
discovered evidence into section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception.67
This conflation is wrong. It contradicts subchapter 6.500’s textual structure
and finds no support in the Cress opinion itself. This inappropriate confla-
tion also imposes adverse consequences on both individual criminal defend-
ants and the criminal justice system generally. The conflation prevents
defendants from taking advantage of the cause and innocence exceptions in
section 6.508(D)(3), resulting in the denial of successive 6.500 motions that
would have otherwise prevailed. More generally, the erroneous conflation
undermines the U.S. Supreme Court’s and the Michigan Supreme Court’s
explicit rejections of a diligence requirement in the Brady context and the
state’s obligation to provide constitutionally adequate counsel. Given that
federal courts may review a petitioner’s claim on the merits, notwithstand-
ing the state court’s denial of the motion as successive for failure to exercise
due diligence, Michigan has an incentive to fix this conflation now. For these
reasons, Michigan courts should cease applying the Cress test when analyz-
ing 6.500 motions that do not raise a newly discovered evidence claim.
A. The Mistake: Courts Conflate Cress and Section 6.502(G)(2)
Perhaps confused by the similar language between section 6.502(G)(2)’s
new evidence exception and Cress’s establishment of a newly discovered evi-
dence doctrine, several courts have complicated postconviction litigation by
erroneously reading a discoverability requirement into section 6.502(G)(2).68
In a few unpublished opinions, courts have either directly imposed a reason-
able diligence requirement69 or, more commonly, applied the four-prong
Cress test to the section 6.502(G)(2) new evidence exception.70 Under the
67. See People v. Swain, 794 N.W.2d 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
68. See id.
69. See, e.g., id. at 102. Without addressing whether the trial court acted properly, the
Swain court noted that the trial court imposed a discoverability requirement on the section
6.502(G)(2) new evidence exception by holding “that the exception in MCR 6.502(G)(2) for
new evidence did not apply because, with reasonable diligence” trial counsel could have dis-
covered the allegedly new evidence. Id.
70. See, e.g., People v. Swain (Swain II), No. 314564, 2015 WL 521623, at *1–4 (Mich. Ct.
App. Feb 5, 2015); People v. Vinson, No. 303593, 2012 WL 3046236, at *6–7 (Mich. Ct. App.
July 26, 2012); People v. Freeman, No. W-86-128340-FC, slip op. at 4–5, 9–14 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 10, 2014) (“[T]he generally applied newly discovered evidence standard set forth in Peo-
ple v Cress has been regularly applied to motions brought under MCR 6.502(G)(2).” (citation
omitted)); People v. Johnson, No. 99-005393-01, slip op. at 3 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012);
People v. Woods, No. 03-11636, slip op. at 6–10 (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 17, 2011) (repeatedly
conflating Brady with the newly discovered evidence test and denying petitioner’s Brady claims
on the ground that the proffered evidence was not newly discovered evidence within the
meaning of Cress).
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latter approach, before the court analyzes the merits of a petitioner’s succes-
sive 6.500 motion, the petitioner must meet the four elements of Cress, in-
cluding that the “the party could not, using reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced the evidence at trial.”71
The Michigan Court of Appeals had a moment of clarity in People v.
Swain.72 Swain, the only published opinion discussing this issue, involved a
successive 6.500 motion that asserted a substantive Cress newly discovered
evidence claim.73 The court briefly discussed the relationship between Cress’s
discoverability requirement and section 6.502(G)(2).74 The trial court had
(erroneously) held that section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception did
not apply, and therefore the 6.500 should be denied as successive, because
the petitioner could have discovered the allegedly new evidence with reason-
able diligence.75 The court of appeals intimated that this construction was
wrong, stating that “there [was] merit” to petitioner’s claim that neither
Cress nor a discoverability element applied to section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evi-
dence exception.76 In other words, the petitioner’s 6.500 motion should not
be denied as successive if she raises new evidence of her underlying substan-
tive claim, even if this new evidence was discoverable.
Despite Swain’s illuminating discussion, the improper conflation be-
tween section 6.502(G) and Cress persists. Swain’s discussion of the relation-
ship between the two legal doctrines was dicta, as the Michigan Court of
Appeals resolved the successive motion issue on other factual grounds.77 And
Swain’s discussion appears to have had little impact, as Michigan courts con-
tinue to conflate Cress and section 6.502(G)(2).78
71. People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Mich. 2003) (quoting People v. Johnson, 545
N.W.2d 637, 638 n.6 (Mich. 1996)).
72. 794 N.W.2d 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010).
73. Swain, 794 N.W.2d at 95–96. Specifically, petitioner Swain represented that the testi-
mony of two witnesses, a neighbor and a school bus driver, would have undermined the com-
plainant’s accusations against her. Id. at 97. Although the court in Swain did not cite Cress
directly, the court clearly applied the Cress analysis, citing instead to People v. Johnson, 545
N.W.2d 637 (Mich. 1996), the case from which Cress derived the four-factor test. See supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
74. Swain, 794 N.W.2d at 106–07.
75. Id. at 102.
76. Id. at 106–107.
77. Both Swain and her counsel were aware of the two witnesses at issue before she filed
her first 6.500 motion. Id. Swain had even raised the issue during trial. Id. Thus, even under
the petitioner’s more generous interpretation of section 6.502(G)(2), Swain’s evidence was not
“new” because she had already “discovered” its existence. If Swain had not known about the
existence of the witnesses until after she filed her successive 6.500 motion, the court would
presumably have held that the testimony of those witnesses constituted new evidence permit-
ting Swain’s successive 6.500 motion to be analyzed on the merits, regardless of whether she
could have discovered their testimony.
78. See, e.g., People v. Vinson, No. 303593, 2012 WL 3046236, at *6–7 (Mich. Ct. App.
July 26, 2012); People v. Freeman, No. W-86-128340-FC, slip op. at 4–5, 9–14 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
Nov. 10, 2014). In a more recent opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals applied the Cress test
to section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception. People v. Swain (Swain II), No. 314564, 2015
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B. The Proper Interpretation of Section 6.502(G)(2)
If section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception is not the same as Cress,
then what does it mean? The answer is provided in the text of the rule: the
petitioner raises new evidence when she files a motion “based on . . . a claim
of new evidence that was not [previously] discovered,” regardless of whether
the evidence could have been discovered.79 Section 6.502(G)(2) operates as a
simple threshold requirement by permitting a court to deny a successive
6.500 motion at the outset (“return without filing”)80 if it raises previously
litigated legal claims or relies on the evidence already presented at trial, on
appeal, or in a previous motion. It permits a court to quickly sort out obvi-
ously litigious or frivolous 6.500 motions that repeatedly raise the same
evidence.
Defining section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception this way does
not mean that convicted defendants can file endless 6.500 motions in
perpetuity. The evidence must still be “new,” meaning that the petitioner
did not know about it before.81 Furthermore, section 6.508(D)(3) prevents
endless litigation because a motion can still be denied as a result of the
defendant’s failure to exercise diligence in discovering the new evidence, un-
less the cause (or innocence) and prejudice exception applies. Overall, defin-
ing the new evidence exception to mean “a claim of new evidence that was
WL 521623, at *1–4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015). However, this opinion is wholly unpersua-
sive, and it is not binding. See Mich. Ct. R. 7.215(C)(1) (“An unpublished opinion is not
precedentially binding under the rule of stare decisis.”). In violation of both stare decisis and
law of the case doctrine, Swain II applied Cress to section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence excep-
tion, and by doing so, ignored the published opinion within the same case intimating that
section 6.502(G)(2) does not have a discoverability requirement. See supra notes 72–77 and
accompanying text. Furthermore, the court of appeals’s reasoning for applying the Cress test
was fallacious. The court merely stated:
Defendant alleges that she has presented the trial court with “new evidence” that was not
discovered before her previous motion for relief from judgment, thereby satisfying the
newly-discovered-evidence exception in MCR 6.502(G)(2). To determine whether evi-
dence is newly discovered, we apply the test articulated in People v. Cress . . . .
Swain II, 2015 WL 521623, at *1. Later in the opinion, addressing whether Cress should apply,
the court replied: “Defendant has not provided this Court, however, with any authority for the
proposition that the standards for evaluating whether evidence is newly discovered for pur-
poses of MCR 6.502(G)(2) are inapplicable in cases involving constitutional claims, nor are we
aware of any such authority.” Id. at *4. This statement is plainly false, as the previous appellate
opinion in Swain’s own case is authority for the proposition that Cress does not apply to
section 6.502(G)(2). See Swain, 794 N.W.2d at 106. Furthermore, the court’s own logic works
against it: the court provided no precedent, policy reasoning, or indeed any rationale to ex-
plain why Cress, a substantive test created wholly separate from subchapter 6.500, should apply
to the new evidence exception to successive motions. See id. at *1–9.
79. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(2).
80. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(1).
81. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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not [previously] discovered” does not risk overburdening an already taxed
judicial system.82
For example, say a defendant files a successive 6.500 motion alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial counsel failed to object to
improper character evidence at trial. The motion should be denied as suc-
cessive. The defendant did not raise new evidence that was not previously
discovered within the meaning of section 6.502(G)(2); she was present at her
own trial, so she knew the improper testimony was admitted without objec-
tion.83 In contrast, imagine the same defendant files a successive 6.500 mo-
tion, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, but this time she claims
her counsel was ineffective because he was under the influence of cocaine
during trial. Assume also that the defendant did not realize her trial counsel
was high during her trial and only recently learned about it because her
counsel was disbarred for drug use.84 This would be new evidence within the
meaning of section 6.502(G)(2), even if a reasonable defendant (or her ap-
pellate counsel) could have discovered the lawyer’s drug habits, because the
defendant only discovered the basis of the ineffectiveness claim after filing
her first 6.500 motion. The ban on successive motions would not bar her
claim. The rest of this Note explains why this interpretation of section
6.502(G)(2) is correct, while conflating Cress and section 6.502(G)(2) is
improper.
C. Subchapter 6.500’s Text and Structure
Imposing the Cress test on a successive 6.500 motion contradicts the
plain text of section 6.502(G)(2).85 Section 6.502(G)(2) says nothing about
discoverability. If the Michigan legislature had wanted to make discoverabil-
ity relevant, it easily could have. Relying on standards from other postcon-
viction regimes, the legislature could have drafted section 6.502(G) to track
federal habeas law, thereby barring successive motions unless the petitioner
raises newly discovered evidence86 or alleges facts “that could not have been
82. Cf. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (“The procedural-default
rule . . . conserve[s] judicial resources and . . . respect[s] the law’s important interest in the
finality of judgments.”).
83. See, e.g., Swain, 794 N.W.2d at 104 (evidence underlying petitioner’s Cress claim was
not “new evidence” for the purposes of section 6.502(G)(2) when petitioner knew about the
evidence at trial).
84. See, e.g., In re Lehr, 133 P.3d 1279, 1279 (Kan. 2006) (order of disbarment) (“[Coun-
sel]’s admitted use of cocaine and marijuana during the course of representing a criminal
defendant in a felony trial . . . caused a mistrial.”).
85. Numerous cases have outlined the basic scheme for statutory interpretation. The
Michigan Court of Appeals has held that “[i]nterpretation of a court rule is subject to the
same basic principles that govern statutory interpretation.” Smith v. Henry Ford Hosp., 557
N.W.2d 154, 156 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). Accordingly, court rules should be interpreted in a
way that gives meaning to each word or phrase. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Erves, 236 N.W.2d
432, 438 (Mich. 1975). An unambiguous court rule is to be enforced as written. People v. Orr,
739 N.W.2d 385, 391 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (2012).
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previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”87 Instead, the
Michigan legislature drafted section 6.502(G)(2) to permit a successive mo-
tion merely upon a petitioner’s presentation of “a claim of new evidence
that was not discovered before the first such motion.”88 Section 6.502(G)(2)
makes no mention of “discoverability,” “diligence,” or “newly discovered
evidence.”89 Accordingly, scholars have acknowledged since the adoption of
subchapter 6.500 that “[l]iterally, the rule does not interpose a requirement
that the [new evidence] could not have been reasonably discovered before
the second motion.”90
Comparing the text of section 6.502(G)(2) and section 6.508(D)(3)
strengthens this conclusion. Unlike in section 6.502(G)(2), section
6.508(D)(3) does address the issue of previously discoverable evidence. Sec-
tion 6.508(D)(3) states that a court may not grant the defendant relief if the
motion “alleges grounds for relief, other than jurisdictional defects, which
could have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence or in a
prior motion under this subchapter unless the defendant demonstrates (a)
good cause . . . and (b) actual prejudice.”91 The language of section
6.508(D)(3) requires that a successful claim must not have been one that
“could have been raised” (unless cause/actual innocence and prejudice can
be shown).92 In contrast, the text of section 6.502(G) requires only that the
evidence was not previously “discovered,” regardless of whether it was discov-
erable, for a court to consider it.93
Imposing a discoverability requirement on section 6.502(G)(2)’s new
evidence exception renders aspects of section 6.508(D)(3) null.94 As ex-
plained above, section 6.508(D)(3) imposes a due diligence, or discoverabil-
ity, requirement on petitioners seeking relief under subchapter 6.500, unless
87. Id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii).
88. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(2).
89. Compare People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Mich. 2003) (holding that a peti-
tioner may not successfully challenge his conviction on the grounds of newly discovered evi-
dence unless the petitioner “could not . . . have discovered and produced the evidence at trial”
(emphasis added) (quoting People v. Johnson, 545 N.W.2d 637, 638 n.6 (Mich. 1996))), with
Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)(2) (“A defendant may file a second or subsequent motion based on . . .
a claim of new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion.” (emphasis
added)).
90. Friedman, supra note 2, at 94–95. Professor Friedman is not careful with his lan-
guage. In using the term “newly discovered evidence” to refer to section 6.502(G)(2)’s new
evidence exception, Friedman likely contributed to the Michigan courts’ confusion over the
distinction between Cress and section 6.502(G)(2). However, Friedman ultimately reaches the
right result, as he is correct in asserting that “[l]iterally,” section 6.502(G)(2) does not contain
a discoverability requirement.
91. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3).
92. Id.
93. Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G).
94. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Erves, 236 N.W.2d 432, 438 (Mich. 1975) (“Statutory con-
struction should attempt to give effect to every clause and word of a statute. . . . [W]ords in a
statute should not be construed in the void, but should be read together to harmonize the
meaning, giving effect to the Act as a whole.”).
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the petitioner can prove cause (or innocence) and prejudice. Because section
6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception says nothing about discoverability, it
also has no exceptions addressing a petitioner’s failure to act diligently.
Thus, under the erroneous interpretation, if a petitioner files a successive
motion based on evidence that was previously discoverable, the petitioner’s
motion would be denied under section 6.502(G) for failing to raise the issue
previously without any analysis regarding whether the petitioner could show
innocence or good cause.95 By preventing a petitioner from taking advantage
of the good cause (or innocence) and prejudice exceptions in section
6.508(D)(3), this reading violates the Michigan Supreme Court’s admonish-
ment that court rules be interpreted in a way that gives meaning to each
word and phrase.96
D. The Cress Opinion
The Cress opinion itself does not support the conclusion that section
6.502(G)(2) has a diligence requirement. Cress did not involve a successive
6.500 motion. Rather, it involved a petitioner’s first and only motion for
postconviction relief.97 Cress merely laid out the four elements a defendant
must meet in order to obtain a new trial on a claim of newly discovered
evidence and then concluded that Cress’s claimed failed on the merits, as a
different result was not likely upon retrial.98
Nothing in the language of the Cress opinion indicates that the four-
element Cress standard should apply to successive 6.500 motions alleging
claims other than newly discovered evidence. Most tellingly, the opinion
never mentions section 6.502 or successive 6.500 motions.99 Furthermore,
Cress did not involve any substantive legal claim beyond “newly discovered
evidence.”100 The defendant did not raise a Brady or ineffective assistance of
counsel claim.101 Thus, there is no indication that the standard announced in
Cress has any applicability beyond cases in which a convicted defendant ex-
plicitly raises a newly discovered evidence claim.
95. People v. Kimble, 684 N.W.2d 669, 674 (Mich. 2004) (“ ‘Good cause’ can be estab-
lished by proving ineffective assistance of counsel.”).
96. See Erves, 236 N.W.2d at 438.
97. See People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 176–77 (Mich. 2003); see also supra notes 44–48
and accompanying text.
98. Cress, 664 N.W.2d at 182, 184.
99. See id. at 174–84. The only reference to subchapter 6.500 in the Cress opinion is an
unexplained citation to section 6.508(D). Id. at 182.
100. Id. at 177 (“[D]efendant filed a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discov-
ered evidence. . . . [T]he only argument at issue in this case is that Michael Ronning . . . had
admitted murdering the victim.”).
101. Id.
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E. Unintended Adverse Consequences
Conflating section 6.502(G)(2) and Cress imposes serious adverse conse-
quences on defendants raising constitutional, non-Cress claims. Engrafting
Cress into section 6.502(G)(2) prevents petitioners from taking advantage of
the cause and innocence exceptions to diligence located in section
6.508(D)(3), resulting in the improper denial of 6.500 motions the Michigan
legislature has signaled should prevail.102 Beyond simply preventing courts
from hearing constitutional claims in individual cases, the erroneous confla-
tion also undermines the Brady and Strickland doctrines. It contradicts the
Brady doctrine’s rejection of a diligence requirement. Furthermore, by
preventing defendants from taking advantage of the good cause exception, it
undermines Strickland’s goal of ensuring that the state provides constitu-
tionally adequate counsel.
1. Consequences for Individual Defendants
When a court properly declines to engraft Cress into the “new evidence”
exception to the ban on successive motions, a nondiligent petitioner’s 6.500
motion may ultimately prevail. Unlike Cress newly discovered evidence
claims, Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not require dili-
gence.103 Thus, the court would not analyze discoverability of the evidence
during the third stage of analysis,104 when it analyzes the underlying substan-
tive claims in the motion. When a petitioner raises a non-Cress claim, the
only time the postconviction court would consider discoverability is when
analyzing the procedural merits of the motion under section 6.508(D)(3).
Yet section 6.508(D)(3) explicitly excuses lack of diligence if the petitioner
can show good cause (or innocence) and prejudice.
The conflation of Cress with section 6.502(G)(2) results in the inappro-
priate denial of successive 6.500 motions that raise a claim other than newly
discovered evidence. By engrafting Cress into section 6.502(G)(2), courts im-
pose a discoverability requirement during the first stage of analysis, when
determining whether the petitioner’s motion falls within the new evidence
exception to the ban on successive motions. The court will deny the 6.500
102. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
103. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (holding that to prove ineffective
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must satisfy “two
components”: deficient performance and prejudice); People v. Chenault, 845 N.W.2d 731, 733
(Mich. 2014) (“We hold that a diligence requirement is not supported by Brady or its
progeny.”).
104. See supra notes 55–66 and accompanying text (outlining the three-stages process a
court should undertake when analyzing a successive 6.500 motion).
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motion as successive if the evidence underlying the claims could have rea-
sonably been discovered.105 The court must then forgo engagement with sec-
tion 6.508(D)(3) or the substantive analysis.106 By failing to analyze the
motion under section 6.508(D)(3), the court’s conflation prevents a peti-
tioner from taking advantage of the cause and innocence exceptions to
diligence.
Of course, the erroneous imposition of a discoverability requirement
does not matter when a petitioner raises only a Cress newly discovered evi-
dence claim. In order to win on the substantive merits of the Cress claim, a
defendant must prove that he could not have reasonably discovered the evi-
dence, one of the four elements of the Cress test.107 Thus, whether the court
imposes a discoverability requirement at the first stage of analysis or the
third stage of analysis, the result is the same if the petitioner could have
discovered the evidence through due diligence: the motion for relief from
judgment is denied.108
If a petitioner raises a non-Cress claim, however, the timing of the impo-
sition of a discoverability requirement can determine the outcome. People v.
Vinson demonstrates this principle and exemplifies the unintended negative
consequences of improperly conflating the two standards. In Vinson, the de-
fendant was convicted of criminal sexual conduct.109 After his previous 6.500
motions were denied, new scientific tests were conducted that undermined
the conviction.110 Vinson filed a successive 6.500 motion, alleging that his
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate the possibil-
ity that the tests could have been conducted during the trial.111 Without
reaching the merits of his claim under Strickland, the Michigan Court of
Appeals denied Vinson’s motion. The court rejected Vinson’s argument that
he fell within section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception to the ban on
successive motions, reasoning that if the scientific testing were “pivotal at
trial . . . reasonable diligence would have required, at the very least, that
Vinson request independent laboratory testing.”112 In other words, the
105. See, e.g., People v. Swain (Swain II), No. 314564, 2015 WL 521623, at *1–2, (Mich.
Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015) (denying petitioner’s 6.500 motion as successive under section
6.502(G)) (“[D]efendant plainly failed to exercise the required reasonable diligence.”).
106. See People v. Vinson, No. 303593, 2012 WL 3046236, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. July 26,
2012) (denying the petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim as successive after con-
cluding that the scientific evidence underlying the ineffectiveness claim could have been dis-
covered with reasonable diligence); People v. Swain, 794 N.W.2d 92, 104 (Mich. Ct. App.
2010) (“Any successive motion that does not assert one of these two exceptions is to be re-
turned to the defendant without filing by the court.”).
107. People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Mich. 2003).
108. See, e.g., Vinson, 2012 WL 3046236, at *6 (denying the petitioner’s 6.500 “newly
discovered evidence” motion because the petitioner was not reasonably diligent in pursuing
certain scientific testing).
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id. at *2.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *6.
June 2015] Disentangling Michigan Court Rule 6.502(G)(2) 1445
Michigan Court of Appeals applied the Cress standard in denying Vinson’s
6.500 motion under section 6.502(G)(1), finding that Vinson could have
discovered the new evidence underlying his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim with due diligence.
The outcome in Vinson would very likely have been different if the court
had not conflated Cress and section 6.502(G)(2). Under the proper view of
section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception, the court would merely have
inquired whether the scientific tests were previously discovered or known
when analyzing whether the petitioner’s 6.500 motion should be denied as
successive. The tests were not previously discovered, as they were only con-
ducted after Vinson’s conviction and previous 6.500 motions.113 Therefore,
Vinson had raised new evidence under section 6.502(G)(2) that permitted
him to avoid the successive motion ban.114 The court should have continued
on to section 6.508(D) analysis, inquiring whether good cause (or actual
innocence) and prejudice excused the failure to exercise reasonable diligence
in securing the scientific tests. Strong evidence existed that Vinson was
wrongfully convicted, and he probably would have fallen within section
6.508(D)(3)’s innocence exception to diligence.115 Finally, given the court of
appeals’s assumption that the scientific testing was “pivotal at trial,”116 it
should have found that Vinson’s counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain
the tests. In other words, if the court of appeals had not conflated section
6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception with Cress, Vinson would likely have
prevailed. He would have fallen within section 6.508(D)(3)’s innocence ex-
ception, and the factual findings indicate that counsel was ineffective. In the
end, the court of appeals’s erroneous conflation was crucial to the outcome
in Vinson’s case.
Another hypothetical example demonstrates the improper outcome that
results from the conflation of Cress and section 6.502(G)(2). Imagine a de-
fendant who has been convicted of murder. The prosecution’s case largely
rested upon the testimony of an eyewitness who allegedly saw the defendant
lurking around the victim’s house at the time of the murder. However, the
prosecution failed to inform the defense about a second eyewitness, who
told the police that the first eyewitness was intoxicated on the night in ques-
tion. This second eyewitness also told the police that he never saw the defen-
dant on the night in question but did see his cousin, who vaguely looks like
113. See id. at *2.
114. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text.
115. See Vinson, 2012 WL 3046236 at *1–3. The victim’s bed sheet in Vinson’s case con-
tained a bloodstain that included semen. Id. at *1. Blood typing showed Vinson’s blood type
was not in the stain. Id. at *1–2. At his original trial, an expert testified that Vinson was a
“nonsecretor,” which meant his blood type would not have shown up in the stain even if
Vinson was the perpetrator, explaining the lack of his blood in the stain. Id. at *2. After Vinson
was convicted, new tests were conducted demonstrating that Vinson actually was a secretor, so
if Vinson had been the perpetrator, his blood type should have been in the stain. Id. at *2–3.
The absence of his blood type in the stain was strong evidence of Vinson’s innocence.
116. Id. at *6.
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the defendant. The prosecution’s failure to disclose this evidence to the de-
fense likely constituted a Brady violation.117 However, suppose that the de-
fendant does not learn about the second eyewitness until after he has
concluded his direct appeal and first postconviction motion proceedings.
Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, defendant’s trial or appellate
counsel could have discovered the existence of the second eyewitness. The
second eyewitness lived near the victim’s house and was actively looking for
defense counsel in order to explain his version of events. He could have
easily been found if either of the defense attorneys had visited the crime
scene. Defendant, confined in prison, obviously could not have investigated
the crime scene himself. He files his first 6.500 motion pro se,118 alleging a
ground unrelated to this Brady violation. Sometime after his first 6.500 mo-
tion is denied, defendant learns of the existence of the second eyewitness
through prison chatter. Armed with this new evidence of a Brady claim (the
existence of the second eyewitness), defendant files a pro se successive 6.500
motion.
The likelihood of the defendant prevailing on the merits of his Brady
claim depends on whether the court conflates Cress with section
6.502(G)(2). If the court does engage in the conflation, the defendant loses.
His 6.500 motion will be denied as successive, as his counsel’s failure to
exercise reasonable diligence (which is imputed to the defendant)119 prevents
him from taking advantage of section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception
to the ban on successive motions.120
In contrast, if the court does not apply Cress when analyzing the succes-
sive nature of the motion, the defendant likely wins. The court would first
find that he had raised “new evidence” within the meaning of section
6.502(G)(2), as he had discovered the existence of the second eyewitness
after he filed his first 6.500 motion. The court would then analyze the mo-
tion under section 6.508(D)(3). This rule would seem to require the court to
deny the 6.500 motion, as his appellate counsel could have found the second
117. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–54 (1972) (noting that when the relia-
bility of a given witness may be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of impeach-
ment evidence or evidence affecting credibility falls within the Brady rule); see also Smith v.
Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630–31 (2012) (holding that suppression of statements that would have
impeached the eyewitness’s testimony constituted a Brady violation); Youngblood v. West Vir-
ginia, 547 U.S. 867, 868–70 (2006) (per curiam) (same).
118. Michigan does not generally provide for counsel during postconviction proceedings.
But a court may appoint counsel at its discretion. Mich. Ct. R. 6.505(A). Counsel must be
appointed if the court orders oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. Id.
119. Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing on the
Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 Yale L.J. 2604, 2610 (2013) (“[U]nder traditional agency
principles, the actions of defense counsel are imputed to the client . . . [including] mistakes by
defense counsel.”); Wendy Zorana Zupac, Note, Mere Negligence or Abandonment? Evaluating
Claims of Attorney Misconduct After Maples v. Thomas, 122 Yale L.J. 1328, 1343 (2013)
(“[E]ven the attorney-agent’s negligence is imputed to the client.”).
120. See, e.g., Vinson, 2012 WL 3046236 at *4–7 (denying defendant’s successive 6.500
motion, which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to exercise reasonable
diligence).
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eyewitness and raised the Brady claim on direct appeal.121 However, our de-
fendant likely falls within the “good cause” exception to section 6.508(D)(3)
because ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute good cause.122 If the
court finds that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to
locate the second eyewitness and the defendant was prejudiced as a result, it
would excuse the lack of diligence and then proceed to analyze the Brady
claim on its merits. As long as the defendant also met his burden on the
elements of his Brady claim, he would be entitled to a new trial. Overall,
Vinson and the hypothetical example demonstrate that the timing of the
discoverability inquiry changes the outcome for a petitioner who raises
claims that could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, but for
which a petitioner can demonstrate good cause (or innocence) and
prejudice for failure to exercise diligence.
2. The Undermining of the Brady and Strickland Doctrines
This improper conflation has broader consequences than the improper
denial in individual cases of successive 6.500 motions. It also undermines
the underlying policy rationales of the Strickland and Brady doctrines.
Reading Cress into section 6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception under-
mines Brady doctrine. A 6.500 motion is often used when a convicted defen-
dant discovers evidence of a Brady violation.123 In order to succeed in a
Brady challenge, a defendant must satisfy three elements: (1) the prosecution
has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is
material.124 The Michigan Supreme Court unanimously held in People v.
Chenault that Brady does not have a diligence requirement and overruled
precedent that held otherwise.125 The Michigan Supreme Court relied on the
U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion that “[o]ur decisions lend no support to the
notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed Brady mate-
rial.”126 The Michigan Supreme Court was very clear that Brady does not
contain a discoverability or diligence element.
Imposing a discoverability requirement upon successive 6.500 motions
would undermine Chenault’s holding and the policy of Brady in general.
121. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3).
122. People v. Kimble, 684 N.W.2d 669, 674 (Mich. 2004); People v. Reed, 535 N.W.2d
496, 499 (Mich. 1995).
123. See supra note 27.
124. People v. Chenault, 845 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Mich. 2014); see also Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
125. Chenault, 845 N.W.2d at 737–38, overruling People v. Lester, 591 N.W.2d 267 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1998).
126. Id. (quoting Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 695 (2004)); see also Strickler v. Greene,
527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999) (“There are [only] three components of a true Brady violation:
The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully
or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”).
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Brady jurisprudence has consistently rejected the imposition of a discovera-
bility requirement,127 but the improper conflation imposes precisely such an
element. A discoverability requirement imposes an additional burden on a
defendant who only discovers evidence of a Brady violation after she filed an
initial 6.500 motion: she must show that she could not have reasonably dis-
covered the Brady violation.128 Such a rule conflicts with Chenault’s clear
and explicit holding that “a diligence requirement is not supported by Brady
or its progeny.”129
Not only would this requirement fly in the face of Chenault’s unmistak-
able holding, it also undermines the policy of the Brady doctrine. The Brady
doctrine imposes “an important prosecutorial duty,”130 ensuring that no
“prosecutorial misstep may have occurred” during trial.131 Imposing a dili-
gence or discoverability requirement creates a system in which prosecutorial
missteps are not deterred. A prosecutor can withhold material and exculpa-
tory evidence from the defense without retribution as long as the defendant
files a 6.500 motion before discovering the violation and the Brady evidence
could have been discovered with reasonable diligence. Thus, an erroneous
construction of the new evidence exception leaves an entire category of
Brady violations, those only discovered after a petitioner files his motion for
relief from judgment, undeterred.
By preventing petitioners from taking advantage of the good cause ex-
ception to diligence, the improper conflating of Cress with section
6.502(G)(2) also undermines the state’s obligation to provide constitution-
ally adequate counsel. Good cause generally excuses a procedural default,
such as the failure to exercise reasonable diligence.132 In the federal habeas
context, the Supreme Court has defined cause as an “external impediment
preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim.”133 Defense attor-
neys’ mistakes are usually imputed to the defendants and, therefore, no ex-
ternal impediment exists.134 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized
that when a defense counsel’s error rises to the level of ineffective assistance
of counsel, “the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for
the [error] be imputed to the State.”135 The state’s failure to fulfill its
127. See, e.g., United States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705, 710–12 (6th Cir. 2013) (refusing to
adopt a diligence requirement for Brady claims).
128. Again, although section 6.508(D) still imposes a discoverability requirement, the
rules explicitly excuse diligence if the cause or innocence exceptions are established. See supra
text accompanying notes 94–96.
129. Chenault, 845 N.W.2d at 733.
130. Id. at 738.
131. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 287.
132. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81–82 (1977).
133. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986).
134. See supra note 119.
135. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
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constitutional obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel thus con-
stitutes an objective factor external to the defense that constitutes cause.136
Subchapter 6.500 also exemplifies this principle. Michigan excuses a pe-
titioner’s failure to diligently raise her constitutional claims if she has good
cause.137 Like the federal courts, Michigan acknowledges that ineffective as-
sistance of counsel constitutes cause.138 Yet, as explained in this Note, the
improper conflation of section 6.502(G)(2) and Cress prevents a petitioner
from taking advantage of the good cause exception.139 By allowing denial of
a successive 6.500 motion without providing an opportunity to establish
cause, this erroneous conflation imputes an attorney’s constitutionally defi-
cient performance to the defendant, even though the U.S. Supreme Court
and the State of Michigan recognize that the state (not the defendant) is at
fault.140 Doing so undermines Strickland, which helps ensure that the state
fulfills its obligation to provide effective counsel.141
F. Interaction with Federal Habeas Review
The possibility of federal habeas review also lurks in the background. If
Michigan courts continue to improperly conflate Cress and section
6.502(G)(2), federal courts might intervene.  This gives Michigan an incen-
tive to fix this statutory interpretation mistake on its own now.
One purpose of federal habeas review is to ensure that a state “pro-
vide[s] an opportunity for full and fair litigation” of constitutional claims.142
If a federal court believes that conflating Cress with section 6.502(G)(2) has
prevented an adequate state forum for the constitutional claims, the federal
court may intervene.143 The federal habeas regime, although full of procedu-
ral barriers,144 provides federal courts the tools to interpose when necessary.
136. Primus, supra note 119, at 2610.
137. Mich. Ct. R. 6.508(D)(3)(a).
138. People v. Kimble, 684 N.W.2d 669, 674 (Mich. 2004).
139. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
140. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488 (“If [an error] is the result of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the
State . . . .”).
141. Primus, supra note 119, at 2607 n.8, 2609–10; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.
362, 391 (2000) (noting that the right to effective counsel imposes an obligation on states).
142. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); see also Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493
(1990) (“The State must not cut off full and fair consideration of mitigating evidence.”); Rose
v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560–64 (1979).
143. Cf. Sanna v. DiPaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[A] federal habeas court ordina-
rily cannot revisit a state court’s disposition of a prisoner’s Fourth Amendment Claims.
Withal, this proposition is not absolute: there is an exception for instances in which a habeas
petitioner had no realistic opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim fully and fairly
in the state system.”).
144. Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 1–2
(2010) (“Federal judges expend enormous amounts of time reviewing habeas petitions from
state prisoners, but much of that time is spent finding ways to dismiss the petitions on proce-
dural grounds without ever addressing their merits.”).
1450 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:1427
For example, while a defendant’s failure to comply with state procedural
rules generally forecloses federal habeas review (the doctrine of procedural
default), federal courts will refuse to apply this doctrine and hear the claim
on the merits if the state procedural rule is inadequate.145 A federal court
may find that a Michigan court’s denial of a motion as successive is inade-
quate because Michigan courts inconsistently apply Cress to section
6.502(G)(2)146 or the conflation unduly burdens a federal right.147 Alterna-
tively, a federal court may excuse the procedural default by finding cause
and prejudice.148 Cause may exist, for example, because the defendant had
ineffective appellate or postconviction counsel or because the state created
an external impediment to the presentation of the claim by committing a
Brady violation.149
145. Id. at 15; see, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103
(1990).
146. Primus, supra note 119, at 2620 (“To be adequate, the underlying state procedural
rule must be firmly established and consistently followed.”). Michigan courts are inconsistent
in their application of Cress to the section 6.502(G)(2) “new evidence” exception. Compare
People v. Roque, Nos. 296197, 297082, 2011 WL 4104977, at *2–3 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15,
2011) (denying 6.500 motion as successive without applying Cress because the defendant’s
present claim was “not based on any actual new evidence” previously undiscovered, as his
counsel had already raised the claim during the original sentencing proceeding), with People v.
Swain (Swain II), No. 314564, 2015 WL 521623, at *1–4 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015) (apply-
ing Cress to deny petitioner’s 6.500 motion raising a Brady claim as successive).
147. DeYoung v. Schriro, 201 F. App’x 443, 445 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] state procedural
rule . . . is inadequate to preclude federal review where the rule frustrates exercise of a federal
right.”); see also Lee, 534 U.S. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[F]ailure to comply with a . . .
rule has been deemed an inadequate state ground only when the State had no legitimate inter-
est in the rule’s enforcement.”); Primus, supra note 144, at 15 (“Before . . . procedurally de-
fault[ing] a habeas petitioner’s claim for failure to comply with a state procedural rule, the
federal court will ask whether the state rule is an adequate one—meaning . . . it is consistently
applied . . . and does not unduly burden the exercise of a federal constitutional right.”). The
unduly burdensome strain of inadequacy may be more difficult to apply to Michigan courts’
improper conflation of Cress and section 6.502(G)(2). Federal habeas doctrine recognizes fi-
nality as a valid concern in the administration of criminal justice. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“[I]nterests of comity and finality must also be considered
in determining the proper scope of habeas review.”); see also Paul M. Bator, Finality in Crimi-
nal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963). Therefore,
a court may find that it is not an undue burden to ban successive motions, even if the motion
is improperly denied because litigation must end at some point. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
509, 520–21 (1982) (plurality opinion) (noting that federal courts need not tolerate “needless
piecemeal litigation” (quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963))). Yet, to the
extent that a constitutional claim could only be discovered after the first postconviction mo-
tion, the conflation of Cress and section 6.502(G)(2) could unduly burden a petitioner’s rights
by failing to let her take advantage of the cause and innocence exceptions in section 6.508(D).
See Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 222 (1988) (finding cause for procedural default because
deliberate concealment of a constitutional violation by local officials was an “objective factor”
that prevented the prisoner’s lawyers from reasonably uncovering the basis of the claim (quot-
ing Murray v. Carrier, 447 U.S. 478, 488 (1986))).
148. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86–87 (1977).
149. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488–89
(1986); Primus, supra note 119, at 2609–10.
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Similarly, a petitioner who establishes the requisite gateway threshold of
actual innocence can have her defaulted claims heard on the merits.150 Fed-
eral courts might be especially interested in intervening in cases in which the
application of Cress to section 6.502(G)(2) results in the denial of a poten-
tially innocent defendant’s 6.500 motion. Federalism concerns underlying
federal habeas review suggest that state courts have the first opportunity to
address an issue.151 Yet, because the conflation of Cress and the new evidence
exception prevents a petitioner from taking advantage of the innocence ex-
ception to diligence in section 6.508(D)(3),152 a federal court may be more
willing to intervene because it will not feel like it is stepping on the state’s
toes. Intervention is especially likely given the strong dedication of federal
habeas doctrine and federal courts to protecting the innocent.153
Federal habeas relief is not inevitable. But doctrines like adequacy, cause
and prejudice, and Schlup v. Delo’s gateway innocence claim provide federal
habeas courts the necessary tools to hear a petitioner’s constitutional claims
on the merits, even when the state has denied her 6.500 motion as successive
based on a failure to exercise reasonable diligence.154 If federal courts start to
litigate defaulted claims on the merits because the conflation of Cress and
section 6.502(G)(2) prevents the “full and fair consideration of constitu-
tional claims,”155 federal courts would encourage Michigan to reexamine and
correct its understanding of the new evidence exception.156
150. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
151. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273 (2005) (“[T]he interests of comity and federalism
dictate that state courts must have the first opportunity to decide a petitioner’s claims.”); see
also Rose, 455 U.S. at 518–19 (majority opinion) (“A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule
will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those
courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error.”).
152. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
153. Recognizing the importance of protecting the innocent, federal courts have crafted
numerous doctrines that permit innocent defendants to bypass procedural barriers that would
ordinarily foreclose habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2012) (“[T]he [federal habeas]
court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless . . . the facts underlying the
claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitu-
tional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty . . . .”); McQuig-
gin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (holding that a habeas petitioner who can
demonstrate actual innocence can bypass the statute of limitations); House v. Bell, 547 U.S.
518, 536 (2006) (“[T]he principles of comity and finality [underlying procedural default] must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.” (quoting Murray,
477 U.S. at 495 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327–32 (holding that
a petitioner who establishes the requisite gateway threshold of actual innocence can have his
defaulted claims heard on the merits); see also Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Rede-
sign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas Corpus, 49 Duke L.J. 947, 987 (2000) (describing the
view that federal habeas corpus functions primarily to ensure that no innocent person is
wrongfully convicted).
154. See supra notes 145–150 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 142.
156. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1044, 1047–50 (1977) (“[Federal habeas review] permit[s]
and encourage[s] a dialogue between state and federal courts that help[s] define and evolve
constitutional rights.”).
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Conclusion
Michigan courts are conflating Cress and section 6.502(G)(2). They do
so by applying Cress’s four-prong legal standard when determining if the
defendant has alleged new evidence that permits a defendant to avoid the
ban on successive motions. Even though the two standards use similar lan-
guage, it is important that courts keep the distinction straight. “Newly dis-
covered evidence” within the meaning of Cress is a legal standard for relief,
while “new evidence that was not discovered” is an exception to a procedu-
ral barrier. Conflating the two standards contradicts the text and structure
of subchapter 6.500 of the Michigan Court Rules. More importantly, by
preventing defendants from accessing the cause and innocence exceptions of
section 6.508(D)(3), the erroneous grafting of Cress into section 6.502(G)(2)
has significant adverse consequences for individual defendants and constitu-
tional doctrines. If and when the issue of the relationship between Cress and
section 6.502(G)(2) reaches the Michigan Supreme Court,157 the court
should clarify the distinction between the two legal doctrines and hold that
discoverability is irrelevant to the successive motion analysis. It is critical
that the Michigan Supreme Court make this clarification, as the improper
conflation between Cress newly discovered evidence and section
6.502(G)(2)’s new evidence exception to the ban on successive motions is an
easy mistake with extraordinary consequences for convicted defendants’
constitutional rights.
157. At the time of the writing of this Note, two cases presenting this issue are poised to
eventually reach the Michigan Supreme Court. See People v. Swain (Swain II), No. 314564,
2015 WL 521623 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2015), appeal docketed, No. 150994 (Mich. Feb. 5,
2015); People v. Freeman, No. W-86-128340-FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 10, 2014), appeal dock-
eted, No. 147449 (Mich. July 22, 2013).
